Who should provide oversight of the U.S. capital markets? Should U.S.-based shareowners adopt a UK style principles-based model and form a Code of Best Practice, in cooperation with a broad array of market industry bodies, to measure the practices of U.S. listed companies? Should shareowners actively engage with companies to encourage them to adhere to the agreed upon best practices over time?

While corporate governance experts debated these issues leading up to the corporate scandals of 2001 and 2002, the U.S. regulators stepped in and took action on behalf of shareowners. Now we are all asking, have the regulators gone too far?

According to the WSJ, the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation report released today cites that excessive regulation is adding to corporate costs, stifling the public securities markets and causing the U.S. markets to lose business to foreign competitors.

Already the Council of Institutional Investors has issued a release stating that they disagree strongly with the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation's assertion that overzealous regulation is stifling U.S. competitiveness. They also believe that many of the panel's recommendations, if adopted, would undermine the effectiveness of market watchdogs and weaken critical investor protections.

Today's WSJ article adds the report encourages securities firms to step forward when they find problems, and it suggests the SEC should act more like federal banking regulators, such as the Federal Reserve. Yet, if the current political climate, feeding off of a growing body of data shows the U.S. capital markets are less competitive now than they were before 2002, results in a decrease in regulation, should securities firms fill the oversight void or should public pension funds or investment managers?

We welcome your comments.